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The City of Weirton, a municipal corporation, was excavating
a public street in preparation for future curbing and paving. The
excavators struck a buried gas transmission line and, as a result
of the ensuing gas leak, an explosion and fire occurred at a private
residence. An action was instituted in the Circuit Court of Han-
cock County on behalf of Susan Marie Long, an infant, by her co-
guardians for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered in
the explosion and fire caused by the alleged concurrent negligence
of the city, the gas company, and two other defendants. Judgment
was entered on a jury verdict against the city and the gas company.
The trial court granted the city's post-trial motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based upon the doctrine of govern-
mental immunity, thereby allowing the judgment to stand against
the gas company alone. The gas company appealed. Held: judg-
ment against the gas company affirmed, order exonerating the city
reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the verdict against the
city. The rule of municipal government immunity from tort liabil-
ity is now abolished in West Virginia. Long v. City of Weirton, 214
S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975).
With the decision in Long v. City of Weirton, West Virginia
has joined "the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions which have
judicially abrogated [the] antiquated doctrine"' of governmental
immunity from tort liability. The court was careful to note, how-
ever, that the abrogation of immunity in Long applied only to
municipal corporations; the question of immunity from suit of
counties was reserved for future consideration.2
I Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 859 (W. Va. 1975).
2 "We wish to note that the instant decision abolishing the doctrine
of municipal immunity from tort liability should not be taken likewise
to have abrogated the supposed immunities of county governments. The
question of immunity, or lack thereof, of counties in respect to their
governmental activities represent an analogous and similar but different
body of law in this jurisdiction. The distinctions are noted and made in
the representative cases of Watkins v. County Court, 30 W. Va. 657 (1888)
and Cunningham v. County Court, 148 W. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964).
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Prior to Long, the law of governmental immunity in West
Virginia was a hodge-podge of distinctions and exceptions. The
State itself is immune from suit by virtue of article VI, section 35
of the West Virginia Constitution.' This provision also protects
state agencies,4 but those agencies immune from suit are within the
jurisdiction of the court of claims.5 Additionally, a state agency
which is covered by a policy of liability insurance may be subject
to suit in a circuit court if the proper procedure is followed.'
Historically, a municipality was liable for tortious conduct
only when liability was statutorily imposed,7 or when the injury-
producing activity was characterized as a "proprietary function"8
of the municipality, i.e., a function normally undertaken by a pri-
Review of those matters shall remain for another day."
Id. at 860.
W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 35 provides: "The State of West Virginia shall never
be made defendant in any court of law or equity, except the State of West Virginia,
including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, or any officer, agent,
or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or attachment
proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee."
Kondos v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 318 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.W. Va. 1970);
Mahone v. State Rd. Comm'n, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S.E. 320 (1925); Schippa v. West
Virginia Liquor Control Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 51, 53 S.E.2d 609 (1948); Hesse v.
State Soil Conservation Comm., 153 W. Va. 111, 168 S.E.2d 293 (1969); State ex
rel. C & D Equip. Co. v. Gainer, 154 W. Va. 83, 174 S.E.2d 729 (1970) (state office
building commission).
The court of claims was created by the State Legislature to deal with claims
brought against the State and State agencies within the court's jurisdiction. See
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume). See also, Note, 76
W. VA. L. REv. 543, 559 & n.60 (1974).
In Morgantown v. Ducker, 153 W. Va. 121, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969), the court
devised six criteria to determine whether a particular entity is a state agency, and
then held that any entity meeting these criteria is within the jurisdiction of the
court of claims. Id. at 125-31, 168 S.E.2d at 301-04.
1 In State ex rel. Scott v. Taylor, 152 W. Va. 151, 160 S.E.2d 146 (1968), the
court gave effect to a pre-trial stipulation whereby the plaintiff agreed to refrain
from enforcing any portion of a judgment in excess of policy limits in return for the
Attorney General's agreement not to assert the state's immunity. See generally,
Note, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 543, 557 (1974).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (1974 Replacement Volume) imposes liability
on municipalities for defective streets and sidewalks when the defect is due to
negligence on the part of the municipality. See, Miller v. Morgantown, 208 S.E.2d
780 (W. Va. 1974).
" Examples of proprietary functions include swimming pools (Ashworth v.
Clarksburg, 118 W. Va. 476, 190 S.E. 763 (1937)), public parks (Warden v. Grafton,
99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925)), and a waterworks system (Wigal v. Parkers-
burg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S.E. 554 (1914)).
2
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vate corporation If the injury-producing activity was held to be a
"governmental function" of the municipality, it was immune from
suit.10 Arguably, liability could also be imposed if the municipality
was protected by liability insurance." However, the jurisdiction of
the court of claims specifically excludes municipalities. 2
The Long decision cannot be utilized as the basis for an attack
on the immunity of the State since the State's immunity is ex-
pressly granted by the West Virginia Constitution. However, the
methodology employed by the court in Long does provide the ana-
lytical vehicle for mounting an attack on the immunity of all gov-
ernmental units not protected by the State's sovereign immunity.
In Long, before the court abrogated municipal immunity, it ini-
tially determined that (1) the immunity of a municipal corporation
was not derived from article VI, section 35 of the State constitu-
tion, 3 and (2) that municipal corporations were not immune by
virtue of the constitutional and statutory incorporation of the com-
mon law into West Virginia jurisprudence. These potential inhi-
bitions against judicial abrogation of municipal immunity neces-
49 Op. Att'y Gen. 133 (1961).
Examples of activities held to be governmental functions include airports
(Van Gilder v. Morgantown, 136 W. Va. 831, 68 S.E.2d 746 (1949)), fire depart-
ments (Mendel & Co. v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233, 57 Am. R. 664 (1886)), and jails
(Shaw v. Charleston, 57 W. Va. 433, 50 S.E. 527 (1905)).
1 See note 6, supra.
12 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-3 (1972 Replacement Volume).
' 214 S.E.2d at 850.
" 214 S.E.2d at 850-54. The court construed W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (1863)
and W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1931). The current constitutional and statutory provisions
are W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13 and W. VA. CODE ANN. 2-1-1 (1972 Replacement
Volume).
W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (1863) provided:
Such parts of the common law and of the laws of the State of Virginia
as are in force within the boundaries of the State of West Virginia when
this constitution goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall
be and continue the law of this State until altered or repealed by the
legislature.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (1972 Replacement Volume) provides:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the
principles of the Constitution of this State, shall continue in force within
the same, except in those respects wherein it was altered by the general
assembly of Virginia before the twentieth day of June, eighteen hundred
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sarily had to be eliminated as bars to dealing with the immunity
rule itself. If the court had determined that municipal immunity
was derived from either the state's sovereign immunity or the com-
mon law, the court would have held that it lacked the authority
to effect any change in the law.5
The first bar to abolishing municipal immunity-the state's
constitutionally granted sovereign immunity-was essentially
eliminated in Higginbotham v. City of Charleston. Language in
earlier cases had extended the state's immunity to municipali-
ties;" however, this notion was dispelled in Higginbotham:
The defendant city contends that Code 1931, 17-10-17, as
amended, is unconstitutional in that it attempts to deprive the
City of Charleston of its governmental immunity from suit. It
argues that such immunity exists by virtue of Article VI, Sec-
tion 35 of the West Virginia Constitution .... It asserts that
the City of Charleston as a "branch" of the state comies within
the ambit of such constitutional provision. We do not agree with
the contention of the defendant. The clear and unambiguous
language of Article VI, Section 35 of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion precludes only the State of West Virginia from being made
a defendant. (Emphasis added.)
The second bar to abrogation of the immunity of municipal
corporations-the constitutional and statutory incorporation of
the common law into the law of West Virginia-was eliminated by
the court's determination that wholesale governmental immunity
from tort liability had never been a part of the common law man-
dated into West Virginia jurisprudence. 9 The common law im-
munity of local governmental units supposedly had its genesis in
the English decision in Russell v. Men of Devon,2" wherein an
action was held not to lie against the inhabitants of the County of
Devon. The actual rationale for the Russell decision has been the
'1 See, W. VA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 2 (re: amending the state constitution); 71
W. VA. L. REv. 341 (1969).
2a 204 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1974).
'7 Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944); Brown's Adm'r
v. Guyandotte, 34 W. Va. 299, 12 S.E. 707 (1890).
204 S.E.2d at 7.
" "Based upon this juridical chronology of the governmental rule,-from Eng-
lish decisions, American adoption and Virginia cases, it is our view that the rule of
governmental immunity for municipal corporations was not incorporated into our
jurisprudence by the constitutional provision or by W.Va.Code 1931, 2-1-1 or its
predecessor version." 214 S.E.2d at 854.
27 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
4
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subject of much scholarly debate;2' however, in Long the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals placed great weight on the fact
that the men of Devon were unincorporated.2 A subsequent Eng-
lish case, The Mayor and Burgesses of Lyme Regis v. Henley,21 was
cited for the proposition that an incorporated public body was not
immune from suit at common law. 24 The court noted that no Vir-
ginia decisions had adopted governmental immunity prior to
1863;2 and, therefore, concluded that "the power to adopt, abro-
gate or modify the so-called rule of 'municipal immunity' from tort
liability is not within the exclusive province of the Legislature. ' 21
Having determined that it was competent to do so, the court
then reconsidered the doctrine of municipal immunity on policy
grounds. Noting the confusion generated by the "nightmarish dis-
tinction in the law of municipal liability: the 'governmental-
proprietary dichotomy,"' 27 the pervasive impact of governmental
activities on private life,2 and the uncertainty as to what risks a
municipality should insure against,2 the court concluded that the
previously existing body of law surrounding municipal liability was
"unsound and unworkable".2" Thus, the new rule was announced:
"Now and hereafter, a municipal corporation shall be liable as if
a private person, for injuries inflicted upon members of the public
which are proximately caused by its negligence in the performance
of functions assumed by it."'3
The court's reasoning in Long strongly foreshadows the fall of
county immunity because the same arguments raised to abolish
the immunity of municipal corporations are applicable to counties.
As was pointed out in Higginbotham, only the sovereign immunity
2, W. PROSSFR. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131 at 978 (4th ed. 1971).
2 "Significantly, the defendants were characterized as mere individuals, unor-
ganized as a public body and unincorporated. Moreover, because there was no such
official body, the court found no treasury, public or otherwise, from which a judg-
ment could be satisfied .... (I)t seems apparent that the court might have
reached a different conclusion had the men of Devon been incorporated." 214
S.E.2d at 852.
3 B & AD 77, 110 Eng. Rep. 29 (1832).
1, 214 S.E.2d at 853.
25 Id.
11 Id. at 854.
2 Id. at 856.
21 Id. at 857.
29 Id. at 858.
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of the state is beyond the reach of the court.3 2 The abolition of
municipal immunity in Long turned upon the fact that the govern-
mental defendant was incorporated, not that it was a municipality
as opposed to a county. 33 County courts-now county commis-
sions31-are incorporated 5 and have means whereby a judgment
may be satisfied.36 The same governmental-proprietary distinction
that the court referred to as "nightmarish" in the law of municipal
liability exists in the law of county liability, 3 and the county, like
the municipality, is excluded from the jurisdiction of the court of
claims." Moreover, the fact that a county court has procured lia-
bility insurance does not waive its immunity.39 In short, the factors
that influenced the court to abolish the immunity of municipal
corporations from tort liability exist in the law of county liability.
An attempt to predict the future of governmental immunity
should not stop with counties. There are many governmental units
created or authorized by statute which have the capacity for tor-
tious conduct. 0 These units can be termed "public corporations,"4'
11 204 S.E.2d at 7.
214 S.E.2d at 852.
' W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (Supp. 1975).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-1 (1969 Replacement Volume).
3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-5-3 (1969 Replacement Volume) sets forth a procedure
for making claims against a county. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-5-8 (1969 Replacement
Volume) requires that a demand for payment be made prior to institution of suit,
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-5-9 (1969 Replacement Volume) provides that a judgment
may be satisfied out of the next county levy.
Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va. 730, 738-39, 93 S.E.2d 44, 48-49 (1956).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-3 (1972 Replacement Volume).
In Cunningham v. County Court, 148 W. Va. 303, 309, 134 S.E.2d 725, 729
(1964), the court held that "the county court's immunity is not affected by the fact
that it carried the policy of liability insurance." The decision in State ex rel. Scott
v., Taylor certainly weakens this decision. See supra, note 6. It is patently absurd
that the purchase of insurance by the State effects a waiver of immunity within
coverage limits, whereas, the purchase of insurance by a county court does not
affect its immunity.
11 Included are watershed improvement districts (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19 -21B-
1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume)), sanitary districts (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-
12-1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume)), public service districts (W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16-13A-1 et seq. (1972 Replacement Volume)), regional airports (W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-29-1 et seq. (1969 Replacement Volume)), and building commissions
(W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-33-1 et seq. (1969 Replacement Volume)).
11 "Public corporations are classified as municipal, quasi-municipal, and
public-quasi corporations. Public corporations include not only municipal corpora-
6
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and are distinguished from governing bodies-municipal corpora-
tions, county commissions and the state-on the ground that they
are created for a limited, specific purpose.2
The first bar to suing a public corporation in tort that must
be eliminated is the state's sovereign immunity. In Hesse v. State
Soil Conservation Committee,4 3 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the State Soil Conservation Committee was
immune from suit as a state agency, but the Potomac Valley Soil
Conservation District was local in nature and, hence, not immune
under the provisions of article VI, section 35 of the State constitu-
tion. " This "local in nature" distinction dovetails with the criteria
set forth in Morgantown v. Ducker" that are determinative of a
state agency: (1) the entity's property is held in trust for the state;
(2) the entity is dependent on the state legislature for its financial
support; (3) the entity functions along lines similar to other state
agencies; (4) the entity performs a function which is properly the
responsibility of the state; (5) a judgment against it would ad-
versely affect the state; and (6) a judgment would have to be paid
out of public funds." Indeed, Hesse and Ducker are flip sides of the
same coin. If a public corporation meets the Ducker criteria, it is
"state" and immunized by article VI, section 35. However, if the
public corporation does not meet the Ducker criteria, it must be
"local in nature" and, therefore, not immune by virtue of article
VI, section 35.47 A priori, it would seem that virtually all public
corporations are local in nature,48 and that the immunity of the
tions, but all other incorporated agencies of government of whatever size and form
or degree .... Cities, towns and villages are regarded as true municipalities
whereas counties, highway districts, and school districts are considered not to be
municipalities but 'quasi municipalities' or public corporations." State v. Board of
Park Comm'rs, 131 W. Va. 417, 424, 47 S.E.2d 689, 694 (1948).
42 131 W. Va. at 426, 47 S.E.2d at 695.
" 153 W. Va. 111, 168 S.E.2d 293 (1969).
"1 Id. at 118, 168 S.E.2d at 297. In determining that a soil conservation district
is local in nature, the court noted, inter alia, that no specific district is created by
the legislature, that a soil conservation district is not funded by the legislature, and
that a soil conservation district has no greater standing than a county board of
education, which is excluded from the definition of "state agency" in W. VA. CODE
§ 14-2-3 (1931). Id. at 118, 168 S.E.2d at 297.
,5 153 W. Va. 121, 168 S.E.2d 298 (1969).
11 Id. at 125-31, 168 S.E.2d at 301-04. See, Note, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 543, 548 &
n.17 (1974).
,' See, Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1,7 (W. Va. 1974).
" No public corporation cited in note 40 holds property in trust for the State,
[Vol. 78
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state is not a bar to public corporation liability.
The Long decision clearly impacts upon the significance of the
common law as a bar to suing a public corporation. The determina-
tion that the common law did not immunize the City of Weirton
was grounded upon the sole criterion that Weirton is incorpo-
rated. " By this rationale, common law governmental immunity
can no longer be utilized as a defense to a tort action by an incorpo-
rated governmental unit in West Virginia. Thus, the common law
should not bar a suit against a public corporation.
The long-range significance of the Long decision is that it
teaches how to attack governmental immunity-eliminate the
sources of immunity. This does not necessarily indicate that the
attack will be successful; but, at the very least, the court is now
in a position to decide a governmental immunity case on the pro-
per ground, i.e., whether the immunity of a particular governmen-
tal unit can be justified as a matter of public policy. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has apparently committed it-
self to cleaning out the "Augean stable"59 of governmental immun-
ity. Only time will tell whether that task will be accomplished in
toto, but Long v. City of Weirton is a bold step in that direction.
James Albert Russell
nor are any funded by the State Legislature, nor would a judgment against any be
paid out of the State treasury. See statutes cited note 40 supra.
41 214 S.E.2d at 850-54.
50 According to legend, Augeus, King of Elis, was possessed of an immense
stable which had been left unclean for thirty years. The task of cleaning it was given
to Hercules who diverted the course of a river and flushed out the Augean stable.
The term "Augean stable" was applied to governmental immunity by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339,
1341 (Wyo. 1974).
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